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ABSTRACT
The British data from the early 1700s through World War I provide an
unmatched opportunity for studying the effects of temporary changes in
government purchases. In this paper I examine the effects of these changes
on interest rates, the quantity of money, the price level, andbudget
deficits. Temporary increases in government purchases—showingup in the
sample as increases in military outlays during wartime—bad positive effects
on long—term interest rates. The effect on the growth rate of money (bank
notes) was positive only during the two periods of suspension of the gold
standard (1797-1821 and 1914-1918). As long as convertibility of bank notes
into specie was maintained, there was no systematic relation ofgovernment
spending to monetary growth. Similarily, the main interplay between
temporary government spending and inflation occurred during the periods of
suspension. Temporary changes in military spending accounted for the bulk of
budget deficits from the early 1700s through 1918. This association explains
the main increases in the ratio of the public debt to GNP, as well as the
decreases that typically occurred during peacetime. Over the sample ofmore
thantwohundred years, I found only two examples of major budget deficits
that were unrelated to wartime—one associated with compensationpayments to
slaveowners in 1835—36 andtheother with a political dispute over the income
tax in 1909—10. Because of the "exogeneity" of these deficits, it is




Rochester, NY 14627Fluctuations in government purchases influence the economy in numerous
ways. There are effects on, real interest rates, and on the quantities of
output, consumption, and investment. There are direct effects on the price
level, as well as indirect effects through the interplay with monetary
growth. There are also effects on the current—account balance and on budget
deficits, which may have additional influences on the economy.
In this paper I follow Benjamin and Kochin (1984) by using the British
data from the start of the eighteenth century through World War I to study
some of the economic effects of government purchases. In practice the main
evidence comes from the variations in military spending that are associated
with war arid peace. One attraction of the sample—from a scientific
viewpoint—is that it features numerous wars of varying sizes. Fortunately.
there are also usable data for long periods on interest rates, price levels,
a narrow monetary aggregate, and budget deficits.
Section 1 deals with interest rates. After developing a theoretical
model, I study the effect of temporary military spending on long—term
interest rates. Section 2 investigates the effects of military spending on
the price level and the quantity of money. Section 3 explores the relation
between military spending and budget deficits.
1. Covernment Purchases and Interest Rates
a. Theoretical Considerations
A number of existing analyses (Hall, 1980; Barro, 198lb, 1987, Chapter
12; Judd, 1985) discuss the effect of temporary government purchases on real
interest rates. The simplest case is for government consumption expenditure
that does not substitute directly for private spending. If an increase in2
government purchases is temporary, households permanent income falls by less
than one—to—one. Accordingly, consumer demand tends to decline by less thai-i
the increase in purchases, and the aggregate demand for goods rises. There
is a corresponding excess of investment demand over desired national saving,
which means—in a closed economy—that the real interest rate must increase.
When the Ricardian view of the public debt is valid—so that households view
taxes and deficits as equivalent—this result obtains independently of
whether the temporary spending is financed by taxes or debt. The same
conclusion holds also in the case of monetary finance as long as changes in
monetary growth do not have major effects on real interest rates.
The tendency for temporary government purchases to raise real interest
rates still follows if government consumption substitutes for private
consumption, as long as this substitution is less than one for one.
Similarly, one can allow for an effect of public services on private
production functions, and hence on the supply of goods. Finally, the
increase in real interest rates applies as well to the case of public
investment, which may substitute imperfectly for private investment.
The basic idea is that a higher real interest rate is the appropriate
price signal when the government's demand for goods is temporarily high.1
This signal motivates people to demand less goods today (for consumption and
investment) and supply more goods today (by working harder and by using
existing capital more intensively). Thus the tendency to substitute
'With anopen economy the effect shows up partly in borrowing from abroad and
partly in a higher real interest rate.I do not consider the effects on the
current—account balance in this paper. See Ahmed (1986) for this type of
analysis.3
intertemporally buffers the shock from the government's unusual demand for
goods.
Benjamin and Kochin (1984, pp. 595-96) point out that temporary
government purchases, such as in wartime, affect the term structure of real
interest rates. For example, suppose that a war starts today and everyone
knows that it will last for one year. The response of the private market is
to substitute intertemporally between the period of high government demand,
which is the current year, and the normal period after the end of the war.
Therefore, there is an increase in real interest rates with maturity greater
than one year. But today's short—term real interest rates (of maturity less
than one year) apply to an interval over which the government's demands are
uniformly high. Since there is no motivation to substitute over time within
the one—year period, there is no apparent upward pressure on short—term
rates.
Figure 1 illustrates these results for a closed economy. Suppose that a
war starts as a surprise at date t1, and that the ratio of spending to CNP,
rises from g2 to gwa'• Suppose further that the spending ratio
remains constant during the war, then falls back to the value gPea at date
when the war ends. Finally, assume that the duration of the war—that is,
the date t2—is known as of date t1.
Consider a model where the representative individual has an infinite
horizon with the constant rate of time preference on utility equal to p.
(For an exposition, see for example, Barro, 1987, Ch. 11.) In the steady
state of this economy (with no growth in real income or population), the real
interest rate equals p. At this point each individual is satisfied with4
constant consumption over time. Figure 1 assumes that the interest rate
R_aPplYing to short—term (instantaneous) loans—is at the value p before
date t1. If there are no storable (investment) goods, then consumption (or
leisure) must fall to match the increase in at date t1. Then consumption
remains constant at this depressed level during the war. Since consumption
is constant—although at a lower level than before—during the war, the
instantaneous interest rate must still be equal to p. Therefore, the path
shown for R in Figure 1 shows no change at date t1 or afterwards during the
2
war.
At date t2 the drop in allows consumption to return to the higher
level associated with peacetime. Since people anticipate the drop in an
equilibrium requires R at time t =t2to be high enough to motivate people
to plan for a discrete upward jump in consumption. In the present (extreme)
context, this requires the instantaneous interest rate to be infinite. Then,
after date t2, consumption is again constant and R =papplies.
Looking at the situation during the war, where t1 < t < t2, short—term
interest rates are unaffected. However, long—term interest rates would
incorporate the high (infinite for an instant) interest rate at time t2.
Hence, as Benjamin and Kochin suggested, there would be a positive relation
between and interest rates that applied to a horizon longer than t2—t.
The effect on the yield to maturity would be strongest when the horizon was
only slightly longer than t2—t.
21f the war were anticipated, then people would expect a discrete fall in
consumption at date t1. In that case the instantaneous interest rate would
have to be minus infinity at date t1. However, the present analysis assumes













The sharp distinction between short—term and long—term interest rates
does not hold if there is either uncertainty about the war's duration or if
there are durable (investment) goods around. In these cases temporary
government purchases tend to increase short—term real interest rates, as well
as longer—term rates.
Figure 2 illustrates the results for a standard one—sector production
function with reproducible (and consumable) capital. The path for R shown
in Figure 1 is no longer an equilibrium because investors would want to
liquidate their capital stocks just before date t2. In the new equilibrium
the wartime spending must crowd out some investment, as well as consumption,
prior to date t2. As the capital stock falls, the interest rate rises to
match the rising marginal product of capital. The interest rate peaks at
date t2—thereafter, the rate falls as the capital stock is rebuilt.3
One implication from the extension to include investment is that the
current short—term interest rate, depends positively on current and
lagged values of Thelagged values matter because they led to reductions
in the capital stock and thereby to a higher current marginal product of
capital. Future values of also matter—however, the effect on current
short—term interest rates is negative, whereas that on current long rates is
uncertain (because future short rates rise).
3The level of consumption falls discretely at datet1, then grows as long as
R > p. Assuming that utility is isoelastic with respect to consumption (and
neglecting effects on leisure), the fastest growth rate of consumption occurs
at date t2. However, the pre—war level of consumption is reattained only








Path of Government Spending and the Interest Rate in Warand Peace,









In this study I use wartime as an observable example of temporary
government expenditure. There are other aspects of wars that can affect real
interest rates, such as the prospect of victory or defeat. These prospects
affect the default premium on bonds, and also influence desired saving and
investment. To the extent that defeat threatens property rights, there are
downward effects on desired investment and saving, which have an ambiguous
net effect on real interest rates. Also, direct wartime controls can
substitute for movements in interest rates as a device for crowding—out
private spending. Then the observed response in interest rates will be
weaker than otherwise. For the British case examined here, this aspect of a
command economy would be important mainly during World War I (see Pollard,
1969, Chapter II).
b. The tta for the United Kingdom
Thus far, there is little evidence from the U.S. time series that
verifies a positive effect of temporary government purchases on real interest
rates—see Barro (1981a; 1987, Chapter 12) and Plosser (1982). But, as
stressed by Benjamin and Kochin (1984), the long—term British data are
especially promising for isolating this effect if it exists. Especially
during the eighteenth century and through 1815, the United Kingdom was
involved in numerous wars, which provide for substantial temporary variations
in government purchases. Further, until World War I, the economy was free of
most other governmental interventions, such as extensive price and
interest—rate controls, which often accompany wars.
Figure 3 shows the ratio of real military spending to trend GNP for the
United Kingdom from 1701 to 1920. Real military spending is nominal spending6a
+
Figue3
The Ratio of Real Military Spendirl&
to Trend Real GNP, 1701—1920
Note: The figure shows the spending ratio, less the mean
value of g, .067.
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divided by an index of wholesale prices.4 Trend real GNP comes from a trend
line through the data on real CNP, using one growth rate (.55%per year) from
1700 to 1770, and another (2.18% per year) from 1771 to l938.
A quick examination of Figure 3 reveals the peaks associated with the
eight major wars from 1701 to 1920 (treating the wars with France from 1793
to 1815 as one event). These wartime periods provide the main evidence about
the effects of temporarily high government purchases. In particular, there
are no comparable variations in non—military spending over the sample period
(except for the transfer payments in 1835, which are discussed in
Section 4)6
The other suggestion from Figure 3 is the absence ofpermanent changes in
the ratio of military spending to GM', at leastup to 1920. This property
4The data on militaryexpenditure are from Mitchell and Deane (1962, pp.
390—91, 396—99). The figures combine the items forarmy, navy and ordnance,
and for expenditures on special expeditions and votes of credit. Thedating
of expenditures refers to disbursements rather than orders (seeBenjamin and
Kochin, 1984, p. 602, n.6). For 172i)-51 the fiscal-year data ended September
29 were treated as calendar year numbers. The same procedurewas used for
1752—99, where the fiscal year ended on October 10. For 1801—54 the fiscal
year figures ended January 5 were treated as applying to the previous
calendar year. For 1855—1919, the fiscal—year data ended March 31were also
viewed as covering the prior calendar year. The data on wholesaleprices are
from Mitchell and Dean (1962, pp. 469-70, 474. 476). The series isa linking
together of the following wholesale price indexes: 1871—1920, Board of Trade
total index of wholesale priàes; 1850—70, Sauerbeck—Statist overall index;
1790—1849, Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz index of domestic arid imported
commodities; 1700-89, Schumpeter—Cilboy index of consumer goods.
5The dataon real GNP are from Feinstein (1972, pp. 14. T1O, 114, 118) for
1856-1918. For 1830-55. the data are from Deane (1968,pp. 104, 106).
Before 1830 there are estimates at 10—year intervals in Deane and Cole(1967.
pp. 78, 282).
6Except for 1835 non—military expenditures of thecentral government remained
between 2 and 3% of trend GNP from 1801 to 1900. See Mitchell and Deane
(1962, pp. 396-98) for the data. These expenditures reached 4% of trend GNP
in the early 1900s, but then fell back to 2% during World War I.8
means that the raw movements in the spending ratio, correspondto values
of the ratio that are temporarily high or low. Hence, the sample will not be
useful in identifying the economic effects of permanent changes in governnient
purchases. In the next section I model the stochastic process for in
order to isolate the temporary part of this variable—that is, the departure
of from some concept of a "normal" value. It is this temporary part that
has the effects on real interest rates shown in Figures 1 and 2. However, as
suggested by inspection of Figure 3, the normal spending ratio changes little
over time. Therefore, for explaining the changes in interest rates or other
variables, the variable turns out to do about as well as my constructed
measure of temporary spending.
Table 1 shows the values of the military spending ratio for the eight
main wars during the sample period. (This tabulation neglects a large number
of small conflicts—in India, China, Afghanistan. Africa, Burma, etc.—that
peaceloving Britain pursued, but which have insubstantial effects on the
military spending ratio.) Note from the table that the value of the spending
ratio (relative to its mean of 6.7%) ranges from a high of 49% during World
War I (1916) to 16% in the Seven—Year's War (1761). 10% for the American
Revolution (1782), 9% during the Napoleonic Wars (1814), 6% for the War of
the Austrian Succession (1748), 5% for the War of the Spanish Succession
(1707), 3% for the Boer War (1901), and 1% during the Crimean War (1855).
Some comparable values for the U.S. are 20% for World War I (1918). 34% for
World War II (1944). and 2% for the Korean War (1952) (see Barro, 1986,
Table 3).
For the long—term interest rate I use the yield on consols (or on the
comparable perpetual annuities for 1729—52), which is available continuously8a
Table 1
Behavior of Temporary Military Spending
during Major Wars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AR*
Average ValuePeak Value (percentage AP
Period War of of points) (X)
(relative to mean of
1702-13 War of Spanish Succession 2.3 5.1 (1707) 2.7e* 1
1740-48War of Austrian 3.3 5.7 (1748) 0.6 1
Succession (and other wars)
1756-63 Seven Years' War 9.6 16.1 (1761) 1.2 2
(French & Indian War)
1775-83American 4.9 9.8 (1782) 1.9 3
Independence
1793-1815 Wars with France 5.2 9.4 (1814) 1.6 74
(including
Napoleonic Wars)
1854-56 Crimean War 0.7 0.7 (1855) 0.2 6
1S99—1902 Boer War 2.5 2.7 (1901) 0.4 4
1914-19 World War I 37.7 49.3 (1916) 1.2 109 'Periodsare 1703—12, 1741—48. 1757-62, 1776-82. 1794-1815, 1855, 1900—01,
1914-18.
3ePeriodsare 1701-12, 1739-47, 1755—62, 1775-82, 1792-1814, 1853—55.
1898-1901,1913—17.
Usesthe rough estimate for R of 6.0% for 1702, andthevalue R =8.7%for
1712—see Homer (1977, p. 156).
Note: is real military spending as a ratio to trend real CNP (see text),
less the mean value of the spending ratio (6.7%) over the period from 1701 to
1918. AR is the change in the consol rate In percentage points, andWis the
• percentage change in the wholesale price index. These changes apply from the
year before each war to the final full year of the war.9
since l729. These government bonds are perpetuities, except that they were
redeemable at paraftera stated number of years. The theory implies that
temporary government spending would havea positiveeffect on these interest
rates. Empirically, the broad nature of this relation is evident from Figure
4. Note that, over the period from 1729 to 1918.8 the interest rate (solid
line) appears to rise along with the spending ratio (dotted line).
Table 1 reports the changes in the long—term interest rate during each of
the major wars. These changes are all positive and in excess of 1 percentage
point in five of the eight cases. Since the standard deviation of the annual
first difference of the interest rate from 1730 to 1918 is .26 percentage
points, these five cases involve increases in interest rates that are 5 to 7
times this standard deviation. (The samplemean ofthe interest rate from
1729 to 1918 is 3.54Z.)
A usable series on short—term interest rates is unavailable for the full
sample. Most short—term interest rates, including the Bank of England's bank
rate, were subject to a usury ceiling of 5% from 1714 until 1833. This
ceiling was an effective constraint until at least 1817. (See Homer, 1977,
pp. 163—65, 205—08.) If the sample started in 1817 or later, then much of
7The data are from Homer (1977,pp. 156, 161—62, 195-97, 416). The yields
apply to 3% annuities or consols until 1888, and to 2—1/2% consols
thereafter. The possibility that the 3% consols would be redeemed at par
implies thattheyields on these instruments were misleadingly high after
1888.
8i terminate the sample in 1918 because non—military government spending
begins to become important after World War I, and because different
accounting conventions apply thereafter to the breakdown between military and

























































































































































the action in the government spending variable would be lost (see Figure 1).
Thus I do not report results with short—term interest rates in this paper.
The interest rate data measure nominal rates rather than the expected
real rates that matter theoretically. The actual inflation rate averaged
0.4X per year from 1701 to 1918 and 0.1% per year from 1701 to 1913. It may
be that the long—term expected rate of inflation was also stable and close to
zero. However, the analysis in section 2 indicates that these long—term
expectations depend on long—term assessments about remaining on (or in some
intervals returning to) the gold standard. Possible changes in the price of
gold—which aid not occur to a significant extent over the sample
period—iriight also come into play. Therefore, I cannot rule out the
possibility that some of the observed variations in interest rates represent
changes in long—term inflationary expectations, rather than movements in real
interest rates.
c. Temporary Military Spending
In this section I model the stochastic process generating the military
spending ratio, anduse the results to construct a measure of temporary
spending. The first difference of is satisfactorily modeled with
second—order autoregressive and moving—average terms—that is, is an ARIMA
(2, 1, 2) process. This process captures the temporary, but serially
correlated, aspects of wartime, and also allows for the possibility of
pernønent shifts in the spending ratio. The fitted equation from 1704 to
1918 is11






(The Q—statistic with 10 lags is 3.1, 5% critical value of 12.6.) If a
constant is added to equation (1). its estimated coefficient is .002.s.e.=
.008—hence,there is no evidence of drift in the ratio of spending to GNP.
Since the coefficients of the two moving—average terms in equation (1)




a =.026, R2 =.88.
Thus, as suggested by inspection of Figure 1. may be stationary in levels.
For subsequent purposes I use the first—difference specification in equation
(1), although the results would be similar with equation (2).
Using equation (1) and the estimated values of the residuals, e. it is
possible to form "forecasts" of for any date t and forecast horizon i.
9The sum is .99, but with an estimated standard error of .39.
°The MA (1) coefficient of .25 probably appears because is a
time—averaged measure of military spending.12
Thereby one can measure the "permanent" ratio of spending toCNP11 as
(3) =(1—o)•( + 6g1
+62g2+...)
wherethe superscript e denotes a forecast, arid 6 is a constant discount
factor such that 1 —6is approximately equal to the difference between the
real interest rate and the growth rate of real GNP. (The constancy of 6 is
only an approximation.) For the British case the long—term real interest
rate (from 1729 to 1913) averaged 3.5%, while the growth rate of real CNP
(from 1730 to 1913) averaged 1.8%. Therefore. 6 should be about 0.98.
Hansen and Sargent (1981, p. 260) provide a formula that can be modified
to calculate for a given value of 6 and for the set of ARMA coefficients
estimated in equation (1). In the present case the process for — in
equation (1) damps out fast enough so that — is close to zero for
I greater than about 10 years. Therefore, as long as 6 is reasonably close
to one (that is, if the discount rate per year is not too large), the measure
of is not very sensitive to the choice of 6.
The temporary part of the spending ratio is = — Thisvariable
is plotted for the value 6 =.98as the dotted line in Figure 5. The
resulting series has a similar pattern to that for the raw series (net of
a constant mean), which is shown as the solid line in Figure5. Further, the
subsequent findings on interest rates and other variables do notdiffer
greatly whether one uses or as an explanatory variable. This result is
not surprising, since the expectation from examination of Figure3 was that
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Figure5
Alternative Measures of Teuiporary Military
Spending, 1705—191813
permanent movements in the spending ratio would be unimportant relative to
the temporary fluctuations. For this reason I have not carried out further
refinements of the measurement of (such as estimating equation (1) jointly
with other equations).
d. Formal Results on Iiterest Rates
I model the determination of the interest rate in the form,
(4) R =a0+ a1 + Ut.
where the coefficient a1 is positive. If the error term u were stationary
with an unconditional mean of zero, then a0 would be the long-run mean of the
interest rate. In fact, for Britain from 1729 to 1918—where the continuous
data series is available—the long—term interest rate exhibits nearly
random—walk behavior, although there is some indication of stationarity.
(The consol rate would have to be close to a random walk or else there would
remain either very high or very low expected returns from holding these
long—term bonds over short periods.) I model the error term in equation (4)
by the first—order autoregressive process,
(5) Ut =Xu1+
where is white noise, andthepositive coefficient X is close to but below
unity.14
Equations (4) and(5)imply that,asidefrom the influence of temporary
military spending, the other determinants of the interest rate.u, are close
to random walks. In the random—walk case where X =1,equation (4) could be
estimated satisfactorily in first—difference form (with a zero constant).
But if X < 1, then it is appropriate to deal with levels of variables.
Conditional on the constructed series for (based on 6 =.98),the
maximum—likelihood estimates of equations (4) and(5)are12
1730-1913:
(6) R =3.54+ 6.lsg , X=.909
(.20) (1.3) (.029)
=.243, R2 =.89,R2 (forRt -Ri)
=.14, DW =2.2
1730—1918:
(7)R =3.54+ 2.6sg . X=.931
(.27) (0.7) (.027)
a =.248, R2 =.89, R2 (forR -Ri)
=.11, DW =2.1
Over the sample from 1730 to 1913 the estimated coefficient on is 6.1,
s.e. =1.3("t—value" relative to 0 of 4.9). The result implies thatan
increaseby 1 percentage point in the temporary—spending ratio raises the
long—term interest rate by 6.1 basis points. A graph of R versus appears
in Figure 6.
Theresultsshown assume the discount factor 6 =.98in the construction of
Based on the fit of the equation for Rt. the unrestricted point estimate
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The estimated value ? =.909, s.e.=.029,implies a "t—value" relative
to the null hypothesis X =1of 3.1. Considering the one—sided alternative,
X < 1. this statistic differs significantly from zero at less than the 1%
level using the t—distribution. It is significant at about the 1% level
according to the distribution that is generated by Monte Carlo methods for an
analogous non—stationary model in Fuller (1976, Table 8.5.2, the section for
T). Thus there is some evidence that supports the stationarity of the
long—term interest rate over the period from 1730 to 1913.
Adding the World War I experience, 1914—18, to the sample in equation (7)
lowers the estimated coefficient on to 2.6, s.e. =0.7.13Although the
interest rate rises from 3.4X in 1913 to 4.6% in 1917—that is, by 1.2
percentage points—the estimated equation (6) would have predicted an
increase by 2.6 points. It may be that the command economy aspects of World
War I, which were mentioned previously, explains the failure of the interest
rate to rise as much as predicted. For this reason, the sample that excludes
World War I in equation (6) may be better than the full sample in equation
(7) for estimating the response of interest rates to temporary spending in a
free—market setting.
13Using a likelihood—ratio test, one can reject at the 5% level the
hypothesis that the data from 1730 to 1913 are generated from the same model
as the data from 1914 to 1918.16
The results differ only slightly if is replaced by as an
explanatory variable.4 For example, over the sample 1730—1913. the results
are
(8)R =3.58+5.6•(g—.067), X =.893,
(.17) (1.1) (.031)
a =.242, R2 =.89, R2 (ForR —Ri)
=.14, DW =2.1,
where .067 is the mean of over the period 1701—1918. Note that the fit of
equation (8) is virtually the same as the that in equation (6).
Because of the cuminulative effect on capital stocks, the theory suggests
thatthecurrent interest rate, R. also reacts positively to lagged values
of Iffive lags are included, the results for the sample, 1730—1913, are
(9) R =3.54+ -2.9g_+3.l2
+3.93
+3.3g,X=.917
(.20) (1.5) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (l.5)t (.030)
a =.234, R2 =.90. R2 (forR -Ri)
=.22, DW =2.2
a previous version (Barro, 1985), I used the variable= —
where was a distributed lag of the current and past values ofIt
turns out that treating as a constant generates a slightly better fit to
R than any of the distributed—lag versions (with positive weights on lagged
values of17
(10) R =3.61+6.3(g—.067) -1.1(g i—.067) +l.9(g2.067) +3.6(g3.067)




a =.233, =.90, R2 (forR -Ri)
=.23, DW =2.2
Equation (9), based on showsan influence of five lagged values, although
the negative effects of and _4arehard to explain. Additional lags
are unimportant. Equation (10) shows that the fit based on is again
similar.
2. Prices and Money
Benjamin and Kochin (1984, pp. 598-600) argue that temporary military
spending has a positive effect on the general price level in the United
Kingdom. In fact, they argue that the dual influence of war accounts for the
celebrated positive association between the interest rate and the price
level, which is knownasthe Gibson Paradox. However, Barsky and Summers
(1985. Section I) argue that the BenjarninlKochin explanation is inadequate
because the Gibson Paradox applies also during nonwar periods.
The connection between military spending and the price level is
straightforward under a paper standard where governments use the printing
press to finance wartime expenditures. Although a common view is that
governments shift readily off of commodity standards and toward paper
standards during wartime or other emergencies, this view does not apply to18
the United Kingdom during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The U.K.
was on some form of commodity standard from 1700 to 1931, except for two
instances of suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England. The first
was from 1797 to 1821 and was precipitated by the wars with France (see
Clapham, 1945, volume II, Chapter 1). The second involved a variety of
restrictions on specie payments that began in the middle of 1914 during World
War I (See Sayers. 1976, Ch. 5). In this case the gold standard was not
resumed until 1925. Although financial crises arose at other
times—especially during some wars of the eighteenth century—the suspension
of specie payments did not occur (see Clapham, 1945, volume I, Chapter 7. for
a discussion). Basically, except for the years 1797—1821 and 1914—1925, the
U.K. was on a gold standard from 1700to1931. (Until 1821 the system was
formally bimetallic with gold overvalued at the mint—see Del Mar,1877.)
Under a gold standard the possibilities for a link between the spending
ratio, andthe price level, P, are limited. Since I measure P by an
index of wholesale prices, the linkage requires an effect of on the price
of a basket of produced, mainly tradable goods relative to the price of gold.
If increased military purchases imply an increase in the demands for these
goods relative to gold, then the price level would rise.
Civen the value of a link between and the quantity of money, M.
amounts to a link between and the real demand for money. The overall
effects here are ambiguous. The real demand for money falls because the
interest rate, R. rises. However, wartime may have a direct positive effect
on the demand for money. In addition, if affects real income, then the
demand for money would change on this count. Empirically, I find no relation19
between and M for periods where the gold standard was maintained (see
below).
During periods when the gold standard is suspended, the prediction is
thatahigher value of leads to faster rates of growth of money and
prices. This prediction is based on the governments incentive to use the
inflation tax under a paper standard.
a. Results for Money
I measure the narrow money supply, M. by the quantity of bank
notes—issued solely by the Bank of England from 1729 to 1764 and from 1775
to 1833, and including also the issues by country. Scottish and Irish banks
15 from 1834 to 1918.
The empirical relation of this concept of money to military spending is
illustrated by the following least—squares regressions:
Suspension periods: 1797—1821, 1914-1918
(11)log(M/M_1) =—.005+l.4O_.26log(M1/M_2).
(.020) (.23) (.18)
a =.090, R2 =.75, DW =1.7
15The data are from Mitchell and Deane, 1962,pp. 441-43, 450—51. Values for
1729 to 1764 refer to August 31 of each year. Those from 1775 to 1833 are
averages of figures from the end of February and the end of August. Values
from 1834 onward are annual averages of monthly or weekly figures. The
available data prior to 1729 are rough estimates. The figures that I found
from 1765 to 1774 are not comparable to those for the other years.20




a =.075, R2 =.03,DW =1.9
There is a strong positive relation between and monetary growth during the
periods of suspension (1797—1821, 1914—1918), but no significant relation
during the gold—standard years.16 (The results are essentially the same if
is replaced by in the regressions.) This finding can also be seen in
Figure 7, which plots the values of log(M) and
The conclusion is that military spending during wars led to money
creation only if it first led to suspension of the gold standard.
Furthermore, this pressure to suspend was successful only in two cases—the
Napoleonic period and World War I—although the sample includes six other
major wars (see Table 1). It is interesting to conjecture why suspension
occurred when it did—in 1797 and effectively in 1914—and not at other
times. For World War I. the magnitude of military spending is probably a
sufficient explanation (see Table 1). However, through 1797, the ratio of
military spending to CNP—which averaged 10.8% from 1794 to 1797—was less
than that of the Seven Years' War (average of 16.3% from 1757 to 1762), and
similar to that of some other wars (9.0% from 1703 to 1712, 10.0% from 1741
to 1748, and 11.6% from 1776 to 1782). The main distinction of the wars with
16A likelihood—ratio testrejects at less thanthe1% level the hypothesis
































































































































































































































France after 1793 was the duration—22 years with only brief
interruptions17—although it is unclear that this length would have been
foreseen in 1797. However it may be that the French Revolution and Napoleon
made the conflicts after 1793 more threatening than the earlier wars. One
other indicator that these conflicts were taken more seriously than the prior
wars was the introduction of new types of taxes—on income and property—in
1799. On the other hand, Clapham's (1945, volume 1, Chapter VII) discussion
of the earlier periods indicates that the Bank of England's reserve of specie
was nearly exhausted in several cases—in 1710, 1745, 1763 and 1783.
Therefore it may be mainly a matter of luck that suspension occurred in 1797
and not at these other times.
b. Results for the Price Level
Estimated equations for inflation rates (based on indexes of wholesale
prices) that parallel the equations for monetary growth are asfollows:18
Suspension Periods: 1797-1821, 1914-1918
(13) log(PIP_1) =—.031+
(.021)(.14)
u =.099, R2 =.37, DW =1.5
7For a discussion, see for example Cole and Priestly (1936, Chapter IX—XII).
18The variable involves the current value of real spending. =
whereC is nominal spending. Therefore, measurement error in Pt (whichis
likely to be serious here) tends to generate a downward bias in a regression
of log(P/P1) on Thereforethe results shown in equations (13) and
(14) are instrumental estimates using as an instrument for the value that
would be calculated if C/P were replaced by C/P1.22
Cold—Standard Periods: 1705-1796, 1822-1913
(14)lo(P/P1) =.003+
(.005)(.15)
a =.062, R2 =—.01(see n. 18 above), DW =1.9
(The lagged dependent variable, log(P1/P2). and lags of are
insignificant if added to equations (13) or (14).) The results show that the
effect of on 1og(P/P1) is significantly positive for the suspension
period and just significantly positive for the gold—standard period.
However, the effect is substantially larger for the period ofsuspension in
equation (13).19 In fact, fluctuations in military spending explain
essentially none of the variations in inflation over the gold—standard
period. Figure 8 shows graphically the relation oflog(P) to
For making long—range forecasts of inflation an important issue is
whether the level of prices is stationary—that is, whether there isa
systematic tendency for the price level to return to a normal value (see
Figure 8). Under the gold standard it is conceivable that the price level
would be stationary. However, in a regression withlog(P) as the dependent
variable, I cannot reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that the coefficient
likelihood—ratio test rejects at less than the 1% level the hypothesis
that the same model for the inflation rate applies over both sub—samples.Figure 8
The Price Level And Temporary Military
pending, 1705—1918
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20 . oflog(P_1) is unity. This finding applies to the gold—standard sample,
1705—1796. 1822—1913, and also to the suspension sample, 1797-1821.
1914—1918. Of course, even a finding that the price level was stationary
under the gold standard would not be so useful if there were a nonzero
probability (presumably related to of shifting to the suspension regime
where the price level was nonstationary.
The main difficulty in using the results from equations (13) and (14) to
calculate long—term expected inflation is the measurement of the transition
probabilities between the regimes. Although the sample is long, it features
only two suspensions (a third if 1931 were added) and one resumption (a
second if 1925 were included). Hence the sample is still small in this
regard.
3. Budget Deficits
a. Military Spending and Budget Deficits
In some previous papers I discussed the tax—smoothing theory of
governilient deficits (Barro, 1979, 1986—see also Pigou, 1928, Ch. VI; Kydland
andPrescott, 1980; and Lucas and Stokey, 1983). Some of the principal
conclusions were the following. First, temporary government spending, as in
wartime, would be financed primarily by budget deficits. Thereby tax rates
20For example,over 1705-1796, 1822—1913, the result of the instrumental
estimation is log(P) =—.009+ +.943lo(P...1).
a' =.063,DW =1.9.
(.008) (.15) (.032)
The test that the coefficient of log(P1) is unity uses Fuller's (1976, p.
373) distribution, which was discussed before, and applies to the one—sided
alternative that the coefficient is less than one. The same outcome with
respect to stationarity obtains if the additional lagged variable, lo(P2).
is added to the regressions.24
rise uniformly during and after the war, instead of being unusually high
during the war. Second, a permanent increase in the ratio of government
spending to GNP leads to a parallel increase in tax rates, with no increase
inthebudget deficit. Third, the government runs deficits during recessions
and surpluses in booms to prevent tax rates from being unusually high or low
at these times. Fourth, expected inflation has a one—to—one effect on the
growth rate of the nominal debt. Thereby the planned behavior of the real
debt is invariant with expected inflation. On the other hand, unexpected
inflation does not affect the budget deficit, and therefore impacts in the
opposite direction on the stock of real debt outstanding.
Empirical results for the United States for the period 1916 to 1983
provided reasonably good estimates for the effects on budget deficits from
business fluctuations and expected inflation (see Barro, 1986). However,
there was less information about the impact of temporary government spending,
which was dominated by the observations for World Wars I and II.
It is clear from the previous discussion that the long—term British data
are well suited for studying the relation of budget deficits to temporary
military spending. On the other hand, the sample does not permit reliable
estimates of cyclical effects. That is because annual data on GNP are
available only since 1830, and the quality of these data before the middle
1850s is especially uncertain. Further, for reasons mentioned earlier, I
have not yet been able to use the data to assess the effects from changes in
anticipated inflation. Therefore, I focus the present study on the relation
between budget deficits and temporary military spending.
I calculate the nominal deficit for each year from the difference between
the government's total expenditures (including interest payments) and total25
revenues.2' I then compute a time series for the stock of public debt
outstanding (at "book value") by adding the cumulative deficit to a benchmark
stock of debt from the end of 1700.22 This procedure is necessary because
the reported figures on the stock of public debt treat all numbers as par
values even when new debt is issued or retired at a discount from par. This
problem is especially serious during the Napoleonic Wars and to some extent
during the American Revolution, where large quantities of debt were issued at
a discount to yield about 5% but were carried on the books as though issued
23
at par (3iC). Hence the change in the public debt as recorded far exceeded
the true deficit at these times. Then the error was effectively undone later
in the nineteenth century when the old debt was eventually redeemed. Thus,
by World War I (and before the 1770s), the series that I calculate turns out
to be close to the reported numbers on the stock of public debt outstanding.
(However, my series is not a market—value construct, since it does not
consider the changes in market value that occurred subsequent to the issue
date of a security.)
Figure 9 shows the ratio of the real public debt (the nominal amount from
the start of the year relative to the wholesale price index for the year) to
trend real CNP from 1701 to 1918. The ratio rose from about 25% in 1701 to
70% in 1718 (after the War of the Spanish Succession) and declined during
21The data are from Mitchell and Deane(1962. pp. 386-98). The dating of the
fiscal years corresponds to that for military spending, as discussed in n. 4
above. Civen this correspondence, there is no problem in matching the budget
deficits with the expenditure numbers.
figure—-- 14.2 million——comes from Mitchell and Deane (1962, p. 401).




















































































































































































peacetime to less than 50% by the early 1740s. Then the ratio reached 90%
after the War of the Austrian Succession (1750) and 140% after the
Seven-Years' War (1764). Following a decline during peacetime to 100% in
1775. the ratio rose to over 130% after the American Revolution (1785).
After another peacetime decline to less than 90% in 1795, the ratio rose to
nearly 160% at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1816, and (with the
sharp decline in the price level) to the all—time peak of 185% in 1822.24
There followed a long peacetime decline—with only minor interruptions from
some small wars—to a low point of 30% in 1914. Then with World War I the
ratio reached 110% in 1918.
Figure 10 shows more clearly the dominant influence of temporary military
spending on budget deficits. This figure graphs the ratio of the nominal
deficit to trend CNP (trend real CNP multiplied by the wholesaleprice
index), along with the temporary—spending ratio, Thefigure shows that
the relationship is positive and also accounts for the bulk of fluctuations
in the deficit.
The specification of the equation for deficits is
(15) (B —Bt1)/Py =b0(BvPy)+
b1g + Vt,
where B is the nominal debt at the end of year t(calculatedas above), B —
B1is the budget deficit for year t, is the wholesale price index,y is
24Using the reported figureson the stock of public debt, this peak ratio is
275% rather than 185%. The difference is the extent to which the debt
figures—recorded at par—overstated the deficit during the wartime years.
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trend real GNP,isthe temporary—spending ratio as discussed before, and
the error term v is generated from
(16) v =•vi+
where is white noise and II<1. Note that the dependent variable in
equation (15) is a deficit—CNP ratio. The coefficient b0 is the growth rate
of the nominal debt that occurs when arid v equal zero. In previous
analysis (Barro. 1979), this rate corresponded to the trend growth rate of
real GNP plus the rate of expected inflation. That is, when =v
=0,the
current deficit is set so as to maintain constancy over time for the planned
ratio of the nominal debt to nominal GNP. In the present setting I treat the
parameter b0 as a constant. However, non—constancy of expected inflation
could be one element that generates serial correlation of theerror term v
in equation (15). The omission of cyclical effects, which would themselves
be autocorrelated, could also generate this serial correlation. The
autogressive form of the error process in equation (16) is intended to
account for these effects.
The estimates of equations (15) and (16) for 1706—1913 are
(B_Bi) Bi
(17) =.013. ,+ .76
Py (.003) Py (.04) (.04)
a =.0087, R2 =.93, DW =2.0
The valueis significantly less thai-i one according to Fuller's (1976,
p. 373) distribution.28
The first coefficient—.0l3. s.e. =.003—shouldequal the trend growth rate
of real GNP plus the average rate of expected inflation. In fact, the
average growth rate of real GNP from 1701 to 1913 was 1.6% per year, while
the average rate of change of the wholesale price index was 0.1% per year.
Thus the estimated value of the coefficient on the lagged debt, .013. does
approximate the trend growth rate of real GNP plus the average rate of
inflation.
The estimated coefficient on .96,s.e. =.04,indicates the fraction
of temporary government spending (as measured) that is financed by deficits.
Note that the estimated coefficient differs significantly from zero, but
insignificantly from unity. The result indicates that temporary military
expenditure was financed by the issue of debt, rather thantaxes.27
The serial correlation coefficient. • =.76,s.e. =.04.presumably picks
up factors such as cyclical fluctuations and persisting variations in
expected inflation. Thus far, I have no detailed results on these elements.
have not allowed for different coefficients in different sub—periods.
although the average growth rate of real CNP from 1701 to 1770 (0.5% per
year) was well below that from 1770 to 1913 (2.1% per year).
27For much of the sample the dominant forms of the central government s tax
revenues were customs duties and excise taxes.(See Mitchell and Deane,
1962. pp. 387-88, 392-94 for the data.) The tax on land was also
significant, amounting to about 20% of total revenue in 1800, but less than
10% by 1840. Income (and property) taxes, begun in 1799. accounted for as
much as 15% of overall revenue during the Napoleonic Wars. After lapsing in
1817. income taxes were reintroduced in 1843 at about 10% of total revenue.
This percentage reached 15% around 1900 and 30% in 1915. An excess-profits
tax for World War I accounted for about 30% of overall receipts. Thus, in
order to generate more tax revenues, the government partly raised the rates
of existing taxes, and partly introduced new types of levies. Also,
especially during World War I, there was a tendency for non—military
components of governmental outlays to fall during wartime.29
With World War I included, the results for the period 1706—1918 are
B—B1 Bi
(18) =.008. + =.81
(.004) (.02) (.04)
a =.0101, =.98, DW =2.1
These results are similar to those in equation (17).
As an example of the effect of wartime, from 1757 to 1762 the average
value of the temporary-spending ratio was 9.6%. Multiplying by the
coefficient .96 from equation (17), the prediction is that the debt—GNP ratio
would rise on average by 9.2 percentage points per year during this war. In
fact, the ratio rose over the period from 0.74 to 1.39 or by 10.8 percentage
points per year.
Similarly, from 1794 to 1815. the average value of was 4.9%. Hence,
the prediction is that the debt—CNP ratio would rise on average by 4.7
percentage points per year (.049 x .96). The actual figures show an increase
from 0.96 to 1.57 for an average increase of 2.8 percentage pointsper year.
(The sharp—and presumably partly unexpected—rise in the price level
accounts for some of the discrepancy.).
During peacetime the variable is negative, rather than zero. Hence,
instead of predicting a constant ratio of the debt to CNP. equation (17) says
that this ratio will fall during peacetime. This behavior underlies the
tendency for the debt—GNP ratio to decline during years that do not involve
major wars, as is apparent from Figure 9. For example, from 1822 to 1913,30
the average value of the variable was —2.1%. Therefore the prediction is
that the debt—CNP ratio would fall on average by 2.0 percentage pointsper
year (—.021 x .96). In fact, the ratio fell over this period from 1.85 to
0.30, or by 1.7 percentage points per year. (The level of the nominal debt
changed relatively little—from564 million at the beginning of 1822 to
643 million at the end of 1913.)
b. Two Episodes of Non—War Budget Deficits
Unlike for the case of wartime, it is typically difficult to identify the
temporary part of fluctuations in peacetime government expenditures. In any
event, the movements in non—military spending were relatively mild over the
sample period—see n. 6 above. Therefore, in explaining budget deficits and
other variables, I did not attempt to include a measure of temporary spending
aside from the military component. However, there are two interesting
episodes of peacetime deficit finance that are worth noting.
Following the decision in 1833 to free the West Indian slaves, there were
large compensatory payments by the British government to slaveowners. The
28 amounts were16.7 million in 1835 and 4.1 million in 1836. These
figures. when divided by the wholesale price index, represented 4.3% and
0.9%, respectively, of trend real GNP. Thus the transfer payments in 1835
were similar in scale to a medium—sized war (see Table 1). Since the
transfers were temporary, they should be included nearly one—to—one in the
concept of the temporary—spending ratio. whichso far included only
28See Mitchell and Deane (1962.p. 399, note e). Some discussion of the
events appears in Burn (1937, Chapter II) and Engerman and Fogel (1974).31
military expenditures. With this adjustment the measured value of rises
in 1835 from -.033 to .010, and in 1836 from —.035 to -.026. Using this
revision to the variable, the estimated deficit—CNP ratio from equation
(17) for 1835 becomes .034, as compared with the actual value of .039. The
previous estimate, based on the unrevised concept of was—.007. For
1836, the revised estimate for the deficit—GNP ratio is —.006, as compared to
the actual value of •003.29 The main point is that the compensatory payments
to slaveowners were financed mainly by debt. Thus the budget deficit reacts
to temporary peacetime spending in a manner similar to temporary wartime
spending.
On the other hand, with respect to interest—rate determination, the
freeing of the slaves and the payments to slaveowners would be different from
temporary military purchases. The freeing of the slaves, per Se, converts
some non—human assets—that is, ownership rights in slaves—into human
capital.3° With "imperfect" capital markets, this change could raise the
desire to save in nonhuman form, and thereby reduce market interest rates.
However, the financing of the compensation payments by public debt offsets
this effect.
The Ricardian view of budget deficits says that the extra public debt is
matched by a higher present value of future taxes, and thereby has no effect
on desired national saving or on interest rates. This view assumes that
29 . . Theprevious estimate for 1836, which was .022, reflected the large
positive residual for 1835 (see equation (17)). If the effect of this
residual were eliminated, then the previous estimate would have been —.016.
am grateful to Levis Kochin for this point.32
imperfections in capital markets are unimportant—therefore the view also
implies that the freeing of the slaves, per Se, has no appreciable impact on
market interest rates. Overall, the Ricardian view predicts no important
effect on interest rates from the freeing of the slaves and the associated
budget deficit.
The actual path of interest rates was 3.76% in 1831, 3.58% in 1832 (when
there was discussion of the pending legislation for freeing the slaves).
3.42% in 1833 (when the emancipation legislation and the compensation package
were enacted). 3.32% in 1834, 3.29% in 1835 (when the main compensatory
payments were made and the budget deficit was large), 3.35% in 1836, and
3.30% in 1837. Thus, despite the large budget deficit in 1835, there was no
apparent impact on interest rates. This finding accords with the Ricardian
view of public debt.
The second episode of non—war budget deficits concerns the debate over
income taxes and other levies in 1909 (actually the fiscal year ended March
1910).31 The dispute over what kinds of taxes to enact and at what levels
produced a legislative deadlock during fiscal 1909-10, which created a
one—year lapse in the government's authority to collect certain revenues,
especially from the income tax. Therefore, although there was no temporary
bulge in expenditures, the sudden drop in receipts, mainly from the income
tax, produced a budget deficit of 1.5% of trend CNP in 1909 (as compared to
an estimated value of —0.4% from equation (17)). This deficit was financed
with short—term debt, which was paid off as promised when the uncollected
31For a discussion, see Mallett (1913,pp. 298—315).33
taxes ("arrears") were paid during the following year. The receipt of these
backlogged taxes, when added to the regular revenues, generated a budget
surplus of 2.0% of trend CNP for 1910 (actually the fiscal year ended March
1911).
The scientific attraction of this episode is that it involves movements
in budget deficits that are not confounded by correlated shifts in government
expenditures for the military or other purposes. Therefore, the behavior of
interest rates in 1909—10 provides information about the effects of a budget
deficit, per se—although a deficit that was pretty much assured to be
temporary and balanced by a surplus the next year. The path of interest
rates was 2.90% in 1908. 2.98% in 1909, (when there was a budget deficit),
3.08% in 1910 (when there was a budget surplus), and 3.15% in 1911. These
data do not indicate that the budget deficit or surplus had a major effecton
interest rates. Thus the results again support the Ricardian view of public
debt.
4. Conclusions
The British data from the early 1700s through World War I provide an
unmatched opportunity for studying the effects of temporary changes in
government purchases. In this paper I examined the effects of these changes
on interest rates, the quantity of money, the price level, and budget
deficits. But the data should be useful for many other purposes.
The main findings are as follows. Temporary increases in government
purchases—showingup inthe sample as increases in military outlays during
wartime—had positive effects on long—term interest rates. The effect on the34
growth rate of money (bank notes) was positive only during the two periods of
suspension of the gold standard (1797—1821 and 1914—1918). As long as
convertibility of bank notes into specie was maintained, there was no
systematic relation of government spending to monetary growth. Similarily,
the main interplay between temporary government spending and inflation
occurred during the periods of suspension.
Temporary changes in military spending accounted for the bulk of budget
deficits from the early 1700s through 1918. This association explains the
main increases in the ratio of the public debt to GNP. as well as the
decreases that typically occurred during peacetime.
Over the sample of more than two hundred years. I found only two examples
of major budget deficits that were unrelated to wartime—one associated with
compensation payments to slaveowners in 1835-36 and the other with a
political dispute over the income tax in 1909—10. Because of the
"exogeneity" of these deficits, it is interesting that interest rates showed
no special movements at these times.35
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